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COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES SPAWNED
BY UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ ARE DOING
VIOLENCE TO THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACT (VAWA): A SURVEY OF CASES AND THE
ONGOING DEBATE OVER HOW THE VAWA WILL
FARE IN THE WAKE OF LOPEZ
Violence is the leading cause of injury to women ages 15-44, more
common than automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths
combined.'
Every week, during 1991, more than 2,000 women were raped and
more than 90 women were murdered.2
Almost one-quarter of convicted rapists never go to prison and
another quarter received sentences in local jails where the average
sentence is 11 months.'
Studies have reported that 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs
or are forced to quit because of the crime's severity.4
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 14, 1994, in response to and in recognition of the
epidemic of violence against women in the United States, Congress
enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The VAWA is a
comprehensive statute designed to provide women6 greater protection
from and recourse against violence and to impose accountability on
abusers and those who commit crimes of violence based on gender
animus.7 The VAWA, which contains seven parts, creates new federal
crimes, strengthens penalties for existing federal sex crimes, and
provides $1.6 billion over six years for education, research, treatment of
domestic and sex crime victims, and the improvement of state criminal
justice systems! Title III of the Act (civil rights provision) creates a
1. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993) (citing Surgeon General Antonio Novello, From the
Surgeon General U.S. Public Health Services, 267 JAMA 3132 (1992)).
2. Id.
3. Id
4. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 39(1991).
5. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8. 16, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
6. Technically, any person victimized by a crime motivated by gender, as defined by the
VAWA, may utilize the VAWA civil rights remedy. In creating this cause of action, however,
Congress focused on rape and domestic violence against women. See generally H.R. REP. No. 103-
395 (1993); S. REP. No. 103-138 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197 (1991); S. REP. No. 101-545 (1990).
7. See Violence Against Women Act §§ 4001-40703, 108 Stat. 1902, 1903-55.
8. Subtitle A, "Safe Streets for Women," increases penalties for repeat sexual abusers,
authorizes appropriation of funds to increase safety for women on public transportation, and creates
a Department of Justice task force. See iL §§ 40101-40156, 108 Stat. at 1902-24. Subtitle B, "Safe
Homes for Women," creates new federal domestic violence crimes, requires that full faith and credit
be given to protection orders from other states, and mandates restitution for federal crimes. See ik.
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positive statutory right for all individuals to be free from gender-
motivated violence and provides a civil remedy so that individuals who
have been denied that right can recover damages.9
The VAWA was passed after four years of congressional hearings,
which chronicled the harmful effects of violence against women on the
national economy."0 For example, in its final report on the VAWA, the
Senate concluded that "Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-
based crimes restricts movement, reduces employment opportunities,
increases health expenditures, and reduces consumer spending, all of
which affect interstate commerce and the national economy. Gender-
based violence bars its most likely targets-women-from full
participation in the national economy."" Congress rooted the
constitutionality of the VAWA in its enumerated powers' under both
§§ 40201-40295, 108 StaL at 1925-42. Subtitle B also authorizes appropriation of millions of
dollars forshdts, = uh education programs, and proliferation of pro-arest policies. See id. Sub-
title C, "Civil Rights for Women," creates a civil right to be free from gender-bsed violence and
provides a civil remedy. See i §§ 40301-40304,108 Star. at 1941-42. Subtitle D. "Equal Justice
for Women in the Courts," authorizes funding to train judges in combating gender bias in the courts.
See i §§ 40401-40422,108 Stt. at 1942-45. Subtitle E "Violece Against Women Act Improve-
ments," authorizcs finding to increase safety on college campuses, requires agoremment report on
battered women's syndrome., and allows for enforcement of restitution orders through suspension
of federal benefits. See id. §§ 40501-40509,108 Sta. at 1945-50. Subtitle F,"National Staker and
Domestic Violence Reduction," authorizes increased access to national crime infomaion regardig
stalking and domestic violence offnders. See i § § 40601-40611, 1OS St:,t at 1950-53. Finally,
Subtitle G, "Protections for Battered Immigrant Women and Children," aldresses the special
protection needs of battered immigrant women and children. See i §§ 40701-40702,103 StaL at
1953-55.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994) (proclaimning that "[a]il persons within the United
States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by genderr). Subsection (c)
provides a remedy for violations of that right. See i § 1398 1(c). Challenges to this provision of
the VAWA will be the focus of this Comment Although the provisions oftheVAWA are subtitles,
they am commonly refened to as tides. Thus, this Author refs to the civil rights provision as Title
IIL
10. ThMese headrings include. Crimes of Vtolence Motivated by Gender Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 103d Cong.
(1993); Violence Against Women: Fighting the Fear:. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993); Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm on Cime
and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1992); Women and
Vwlence: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990): Domn'stic
Vwlence: Teronsm in the Home. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs. and
Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. (1990).
11. S.REP.No. 103-138,at54(1993). The House Coakrence resinlilkfindings, stating
that
[c]dmes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate
commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in
employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business [ic], and in
places involved, in interstate commerce; crimes of violence motivated by gender have
a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by diminishing national pro-
ductivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the
demand for interstate products.
See HR. CONF. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994).
12. See U.S. CoNSr. art. I, § I ("Al legislative Powus herein granted shall beve-ted in [the,]
Congress.. .. "); McCulloch v. Mariland, 17 U.S. 316.405 (1819) ('This [fedcral] govemrnment is
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the Commerce Clause and section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.13
In doing so, Congress stated that "[a] federal civil rights action... is
necessary to guarantee equal protection of the laws and to reduce the
substantial adverse effects on interstate commerce caused by crimes of
violence motivated by gender."'4
In 1994, when Congress passed the VAWA, the United States
Supreme Court had not invalidated legislation relying on Congress's
Commerce Clause power in nearly sixty years. 5 Soon after the
VAWA's enactment, however, Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause was restricted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez. 6
In Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
(GFSZA)," which prohibited "any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that person knows, or has reasonable cause to believe,
is a school zone."' 8 The Court determined that, in enacting the GFSZA,
Congress had exceeded the outer limits of its power under the
Commerce Clause. 9
Lopez revived and invigorated the long-running debate over the reach
of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that certain aspects of Lopez would result in legal
uncertainty.2 Indeed, that prediction has come to pass. Since 1995, the
potential rieach of the Lopez decision has been widely debated.2'
Individuals named in civil suits or cbhrged under federal statutes enacted
pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause power have, not surprisingly,
acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers."); LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN
CoN OrmiONAL LAW § 5-1, at 224 (1978) ("Congress is thus a legislative body possessing only
limited powers-those granted to it by the Constitution.").
13. The Commerce Clause provides Congress with authority "ft]o regulate Commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states...." U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl 3. The Fourteenth
Amendment states, in pertinent part "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." US. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1. It also states that, "The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." IL § 5.
14. HR. REP. No. 103-711, at 922 (1994).
15. The 1935 decision in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
549-50 (1935), was the last time the Supreme Court linited Congress's Commerce Clause authority,
except for National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which was subsequently
overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
16. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1990).
18. ld.
19. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551,557.
20. See id. at 566. The Court acknowledged that determining whether an activity is
commercial or noncommercial can result in legal uncertainty, but said that uncertainty always
results when determining the limits of constitutionally enumerated powers. See id.
21. See, e.g., United States-v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564,580 n.11 (6th Cir. 1996) (Batchelder,
J., concurring) (stating that "Lopez presages a return to the day when Congress's interstate
commerce authority had meaningful limits"); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569,591 n.1, 603
(3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., dissenting) (stating that Lopez was not just another Supreme Court case
but a watershed "that shifted the outer boundary of the Commerce Clause"). Based on a Westlaw
search, since it was decided on April 26, 1995, Lopez has been cited in over 1300 reported
decisions.
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exploited this uncertainty.? Those facing suits under the VAWA are no
different. To date, there have been constitutional challenges made in
almost every reported case arising under the civil rights provision of the
Act. Judicial responses to these challenges have varied, ranging from:
upholding the constitutionality of the Act without reservations-m
upholding the Act with strong reservations;' and striking down the Act
as unconstitutional.Z Recently, the only decision finding the Act
unconstitutional was reversed in a two-to-one decision by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals!' Nevertheless, due to the great uncertainty
generated by Lopez, commentators agree that the United States Supreme
Court will rule on the constitutionality of the VAWA as soon as the
opportunity arises?
This Comment focuses on the challenges to the VAWA's civil rights
provision and the ongoing debate about how the VAWA will fare in the
wake of Lopez. Section II discusses the legislative history of the VAWA
and gives an overview of the Act, focusing on the civil rights provision.
The Lopez decision is reviewed in Section DI. Section IV contains a
survey of three cases brought under the civil rights provision-of the
VAWA involving constitutional challenges in which the courts
employed varied reasoning with varied results? A discussion of
22. A small number of courts have cited Lopez to find federal statutes invalid. See, e.g..
United States v. Pappadopouios, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that receipt of natural gas
from out-of-state source was insufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction for arson conviction);
Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (declaring the Freedom of Aces to Clinic
Entrances Act an invalid use of congressional power), rev'd, 126 F.3d 575 (4th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding that the Cuild Support Recoey Act.
which punished the failure to pay child support, was an unconstitutional exerci of congressional
power), rev'" 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996). and cert. denle4 117 S. C. 1567 (1997).
23. See Doev. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996). See ifr tex accompanying notes
84-104.
24. See Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D. Team. 1997). See infra text
accompanying notes 146-65.
25. See Brzonkalav. Virginia Polytechnic &Stae Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D.Va. 1996).
See infia text accompanying notes 105.44.
26. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechic Inst. & State Univ. 132F.3d 949(4th Cr. 1997).
27. See, e.g., Morning Ediion: Supreme Court Session Preaew (NPR rdio bronAcast, Oct.
6,1997), available in 1997 WL 12823426.
28. Other provisions of the VAWA have also faced constitutional challenges. See, e.g..
United States v. Bailey. 112 F.3d 758 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 240 (1997). Baly
appealed his conviction under 18 U.S.C § 2261(a)(2), Interstate Domestic Vio!ence. Bailey was
found guilty of assaulting his wife and subsequently putting her in the tunk of his car and driving
in and out of state over a period of fi edays before finally taking her to a hospita See i at 761.
The hospital recorded her injuries upon arival as a three-inch Laceration on her forehead, two black
eyes, three wounds on her forehead that were still bleeding, a subconjunctive hemorrhage in her
right eye, comeal abrasions, bruiseson her throat, abrasions on her knees. pressure sores on h r feet.
ligatur bruises on her wrists and ankles from being bound, severe anoxic brain injury due to lack
of oxygen, and renal failure caused by profound dehydration resulting from not having edequate
food or water for three to four days. See id. at 762.
Bailey's constitutional challenge to the statute relied upon Lopez. The court stated that. -it ris]
unnecsary to go in detail into the arguments applicable in Lopez. for we think previous decisions
of the Supreme Court apply and that the statute in question is valid." Id. at 766. Th precede t the
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Lopez's effects on Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and an analysis of
the holdings and rationales of the decisions in the surveyed cases,
follows in Section V. Section V also includes an analysis of the
enactment of the VAWA under the Fourteenth Amendment as an
alternative base of power upon which to uphold the constitutionality of
the VAWA. This Comment concludes that the VAWA is
constitutionally sound under Congress's broad Commerce Clause power
and should survive Lopez. Additionally, this Comment calls for
clarification of Lopez by the Supreme Court in order to lift the cloud of
uncertainty that currently surrounds that decision.
I. THE VAWA AND ITS CIVIL RIGHTS PROVISION
Congress enacted the VAWA to combat "the escalating problem of
violence against women."29 In considering the VAWA between 1990
and 1994, Congress held no fewer than five hearings on the topic of
violence against women' and "amassed substantial documentation on
how gender-based violence impacts interstate commerce and interferes
with women's ability to enjoy equal protection of the laws."'" Among
Congress's rationales for enacting the VAWA was the recognition that
court referred to was Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), where the Supreme Court
upheld the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910, and Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946),
where the Court upheld the Mann Act. See i1 Both of those cases involved the transportation of
women across state lines for the purpose of being mistresses or plural wives. The Bailey court
ended its somewhat cursory analysis, finding the statute constitutional because the cited precedent
held that transportation of individuals across state lines was interstate commerce. See id, In a
footnote, however, the court explicitly indicated that it was expressing no opinion as to Title I of
the Act and was only concerned with the validity of the interstate domestic violence criminal
provision of the Act. See id. at 765 n.6.
See also United States v. Wright, 965 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Neb.), rev'd, 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir.
1997). In Wright, the defendant moved to dismiss his indictment based upon the unconstitutionality
of 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1), Interstate Violation of a Protection Order. The district court found the
statute unconstitutional, stating that merely "crossing a state line" was not "interstate commerce."
Id. at 1308. The court further stated that, "while crossing a state line may be activity that is
'interstate,' the government has failed to present any statutory language, legislative history, or other
authority to support its assertion that 'crossing a state line' constitutes interstate commerce subject
to regulation by Congress." 1,d The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, citing
Supreme Court precedent and stating that crossing state lines is interstate commerce regardless of
whether any commercial activity is involved. See United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274, 1275
(8th Cir. 1997) (pointing out that the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle in Camps
NewfoundlOwatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997)).
Finally, for the first reported decision involving a woman being charged under the VAWA, see
United States v. Gluznan, 953 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). There, Rita Gluzman was convicted
after her employee helped her kill her husband, dismember the body, and put the pieces in plastic
bags. Because all of this conduct took place in New York and New Jersey, Gluzman was charged
under the VAWA's Interstate Domestic Violence provision. She challenged her conviction on the
basis that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in enacting the statute, but the court
upheld the statute, adopting an analysis similar to that employed in Bailey. See id, at 89.
29. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993).
30. See supra note 10.
31. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 611 (D. Conn. 1996).
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violence against women poses a very serious threat to this nation 2
Congress concluded that only a national showing of intolerance for
gender-based violence could stem this threat?3 Therefore, Congress
resolved that federal legislation constituted an appropriate and necessary
step toward eliminating gender-based violence?1
The VAWA addresses a wide variety of subjects including, interalia,
gender bias in the courts," use of federal monies to set up a nationwide
hotline for domestic abuse victims," and deportation relief for abused
immigrants.' Because of the breadth of the subject matter regulated
under the VAWA, its provisions are scattered throughout the United
States Code. Additionally, the Act bestows a fiscal benefit upon states
by allowing for substantial grants of federal money in future
congressional budgets to fund battered women's shelters, law
enforcement training regarding domestic calls, local hotlines, and other
localized efforts to combat domestic violence.38
In enacting the VAWA, Congress relied on its broad power under the
Commerce Clause.39 Due to the use of this constitutional grant of
authority, most of the congressional findings focused on the impact of
gender-based violence on the national economy. Among the "economic
effect" findings, Congress estimated that $5 to $10 billion was spent
32. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37(1993).
33. See id. at 42 (promising that the VAWA -is designed to remedy not only the violent
effects of the problem, but the subtleprjudices that lurk behind it"); see also S. REP. No. 102-197,
at 35 (1991) (declaring that "[this] legislation is an important step ... in the direction of deveoping
what we need the most-a national consensus that this society will not tolerate this kind of
violence").
34. SeeS.REP.NO. 103-138,at42.
35. See ViolenceAgainst Women Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-322. §§ 40401-40422. 103
Stat. 1902, 1942-45 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 13993 (1994)).
36. See id §§ 40201-40211,108 Stat. at 1925-26. Mbay individuals wording with tho=
who have been affected by domestic violence prefer the term "'survivor," but as Congress and the
courts still generally use the term "victim" this Comment will also.
-37. See id. §§ 40701-40702,108 Stat. at 1953-55.
38. See James D. PoIley, IV, DOJ Budget Request For Fiscal Year 1998, P OSECtTrO.
MarchlApril 1997, at 40. As Polley explains:
The VAWA would provide $7 million to implement a research agenda, in conjunction
with HH and other agencics to determine what works in prevention. intentnion and
control of violence against women. Other programs would include S59 million.., in
discretionary grants to implement mandatory and pro-arrest policie and $160
million ... in formula grants to state and local governments to deveop proactive.,
coordinated, and integrated law enforcement and prosecution strategies.... Mhe
would also be $15 million.. in grants to states and local governments in rural state
to establish and expand cooperative efforts among prosecutor, police, and victim
advocacy groups to respond to domestic violence and child abuse.
ML; see also Violence Against Women Act §§ 40121,40156, 40231, 40295,103 Stat. 1902. 19 10-
16, 1922-23, 1932-34, 1940-41 (authorizing appropriations totaling $241 million for fiscal year
1998 alone to be used to strengthen law enforcement and prosecution strategies and to encourage
domestic violence arrest policies); see id. § 40507, 108 StaL at 1949-50 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 14013 (1994)) (providing for studies of and reports on battered women's syndroae).
39. U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 603, 610 (D. Conn.
1996).
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each year for medical care, criminal justice, and other costs related to
domestic violence.'
One of the most controversial provisions of the VAWA is the civil
rights provision, the operative subsection of which is entitled "Right to
be free from crimes of violence."' By enacting the civil rights
provision, Congress effectively announced that "violence motivated by
gender is not merely an individual crime of personal injury, but a form
of discrimination-an assault on [the] publicly shared ideal of
equality."42 The civil rights provision creates a positive statutory right
for all persons within the United States to be free from crimes of
violence motivated by gender.43 Moreover, the Act provides a tool-a
civil cause of action-which can be used to recover for a violation of
this right. 4
The VAWA civil rights, provision is the first civil rights statute
specifically addressing gender-motivated violence.4 Congress found that
existing laws prohibited gender-based crimes in the workplace but that,
outside of the workplace, no civil rights protection existed for gender-
motivated discriminatory acts of violence.O Congress also found
numerous barriers to protection from these crimes, including: corro-
boration and utmost resistance rules in rape cases; spousal immunities
for rape and battery; and jury instructions that questioned the victim's
40. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993) (citations omitted); see also supra text
accompanying notes 1-5.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994). Part C of the VAWA, entitled "Civil Rights for Women,"
is referred to as the "civil rights provision" throughout this Comment.
42. Julie Goldscheid & Susan Kraham, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against
Women Act, 29 CEAmGHOUSE REV. 505,505 (1995).
43. As stated in the VAWA, the purpose of the civil rights provision is as follows:
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the
Constitution, it is the purpose of this part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender
motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting
interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of
crimes of violence motivated by gender.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994). In order to succeed in an action under the VAWA's civil rights
provision, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was a victim of a
crime of violence and that the perpetrator of that crime was motivated by the victim's gender. See
id. § 13981(e)(1). Because this is a civil rights provision, proof of intent or "animus" can be
achieved by evidence similar to that used in other civil rights cases, such as derogatory epithets, a
pattern of similar attacks, excessive force, and lack ofothermotivation. See Goldscheid & Krnham,
supr note 42, at 509. A "crime ofviolence7 is defined in the statute as an act that would constitute
a felony under state or federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2Xa) (1994). For commentary
suggesting that this reliance on state law may perpetuate the worst aspects of federalism by creating
a federal civil rights remedy dependent upon the very state laws whose inadequacies are part of the
justification for the federal remedy itself, see David Frazee, An Imperfe t Remedy For Imperfect
Violence: The Construction of Civil Rights in the Violence Against Women Act, I MICH. J. OF
GENDER&L 163 (1993).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (creating a cause of action for a victim whose § 13581(a)
rights have been violated).
45. See Frazee, supra note 43, at 164-65.
46. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 29 (1993).
416
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credibility.4 Furthermore, Congress determined that state and federal
laws were inadequate to protect against the bias element of gender-based
crimes.
Because of these barriers, biases, and inadequacies, Congress enacted
the VAWA civil rights remedy to fill the gap in civil rights law and to
provide victims with another avenue for legal redress.49 By invoking the
rights conferred by the civil rights provision of the VAWA, the victim
of a violent crime motivated by gender may bring a civil lawsuit in
federal or state court, seeking compensatory damages, punitive damages,
injunctive relief, and attorney's feesO The Senate focused on the
victim's power and control in the process, stating that the VAWA civil
rights remedy provides victims with a "legal tool" that the victim alone
can deploy without interference by a state prosecutor 5' The Senate
Judiciary Committee praised another feature of the remedy that it viewed
as highly favorable to the victim-a defendant may not invoke his or her
Fifth Amendment privilege in a civil cause of action and, therefore, the
victim may force the defendant to testify.'
The civil rights provision encountered early opposition. In 1991, the
Judicial Conference of the United States officially opposed the provision
because claims under it would "embroil the federal courts in domestic
relations disputes."' The opposition of the Judicial Conference was
subsequently withdrawn, though not recanted. Nevertheless, the
obstacles facing the VAWA did not die. Instead, the statute now faces
a serious challenge birthed by the Lopez decision.
47. See S.REP. No. 102-197,at44-4S(1991).
48. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385(1994).
49. See S. RE. No. 101-545, at 42 (1990).
50. See Goldscheid & Kraham, supra note 42 at 505; see also 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
51. SeeS. REP. No. 101-545. at42 (1990).
52. See id.
53. Report ofthe Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Comm. on Gender-Based Violence I (SepL
1991). The Report stated that the VAWA would "flood [federal courts] with cams that have been
traditionally within the province of state courts." Id. at 7. In his year-end rexport Chief Justice
Rebnquist stated that federal courts should be "resrved for issues vte impoxarnt national interests
predominate." Wlliam M. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, 24 THE THIRD BRANCH 1, 2 (1992). He then endorsed the Judicial Conferences'
opposition to the VAWA and reiterated that it "could involve the federal courts in a waolt host of
domestic relations disputes." Id. at 3.
54. The Judicial Conference of the United States subsequently withdrew its opposition to
the civil rights provisions. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love': IWfe Beating as Perogative
and Privacy, 105 YALEI-1. 2117,2207 n.297 (1996). For commentary discussing opposition by
the judiciary. see Rode Sherman, Fears Expressed On Proposed Bill To Aid Women, NAT'LLJ,
June 3,1991, at 3, and Mary Wisn ewski, Judges Oppose Federal Spouse Abuse Bill. CL DAILY
L Buu- Oct. 4,1991, at 2. For cormantary discussing support by thejudiciary. =e Hearings on
HJ. 1133 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary. 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1993), %ter-ein the Honorable Judith Billings, Judge of the
Utah Court of Appeals and President of the National Association of Women Judges stated that.
"[t]he National Association of Women Judges believes that the creation of a federal civil rights
remedy will provide needed congressional recognition that gender-based violence is a national
problem." Id.
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IL UNITED STATS v. LOPEZ
In United States v. Lopez,5 decided a mere seven months after the
enactment of the VAWA, the United States Supreme Court limited
Congress's commerce power for the first time in over half a century.56
The case involved the GFSZA, which criminalized "possess[ion of] a
firearm at a place that the individual knows ... is a school zone."" A
high school student was charged under the statute, and moved to dismiss
on grounds that the statute was "unconstitutional as it is beyond the
power of Congress to legislate control over our public schools." ' The
district court denied the motion, finding the statute constitutional under
Congress's "power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and
concluding that the 'business' of elementary, middle and high
schools... affects interstate commerce." The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit agreed with respondent's argument that Congress had
exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause.6' The Supreme Court
affirmed the appellate court's decision. The Court held that the Act
exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause powers because the regulated
activity did not have a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce.
6
'
In its opinion, the Supreme Court described the three broad categories
of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power:
channels of interstate commerce; instrumentalities of interstate
commerce (or persons or things in interstate commerce); and activity
"substantially affecting" interstate commerce. The Court quickly
excluded the first two categories as inapplicable and stated that the Act
could only be sustained as a regulation of activity "substantially
affecting" interstate commerce.63 In determining whether a regulated
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the Court
acknowledged that it did not require congressional findings, but
suggested that such findings would be helpful when the regulated
activity's nexus to interstate commerce was not "visible to the naked
eye."" Further, the Court noted that it would consider legislative
findings as part of its "independent evaluation of constitutionality under
55. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
56. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After
Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L REv. 801, 811 (1996) (discussing how Lopez avoided overruling prior
cases).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2XA) (1994); see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
58. United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. at 551.
59. Id. at 551-52. -
60. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367.-68 (5th Cir. 1993).
61. See id. at567.
62. See id. at 558-59. The Court clarified that the third category required that an activity
"substantially affect" interstate commerce rather than merely "affect" it. See id
63. See id. at 559.
64. Id. at 563.
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the Commerce Clause" ' The Court could not consider the GFSZA's
legislative history, however, because Congress did not ma]ke any pre-
enactment findings regarding the effects of gun possession in a school
zone on interstate commerce.
To explain the requisite nexus between the regulated activity and
interstate commerce, the Government offered the broad and speculative
argument that gun possession near schools may result in violent crime
which would, in turn, affect the national economy in two ways: first,
substantial costs of violent crime would be spread throughout the
population by insurance; and, second, violent crime would discourage
travel to areas "perceived to be unsafe." The Government further
argued that the presence of guns in schools handicaps the educational
process by threatening the learning environment. 6r As a result, it argued,
the nation will have a less educated and therefore "less productive
citizenry" which will substantially affect interstate commerce.69
The Court responded that, under the Government's "cost of crime"
and "national productivity" theories, "it is difficult to perceive any
limitation on federal powers... ,1' The Court further stated that the
premise that guns in schools diminish education, and education affects
the economy, and the economy is inseparable from interstate commerce,
was too attenuated and required the Court to "pile inference upon
inference" to find an adequate connection to interstate commerce'
The Court proceeded to emphasize the non-commercial nature of the
statute, concluding that the GFSZA did not regulate a commercial
enterprise or commercial actors and that it was not an essential part of
a larger regulation of economic activity.Z In its analysis, the Court
distinguished the GFSZA from a number of other statutes regulating
intrastate activities.7 The Court stated that the GFSZA was essentially
65. I. at 562.
66. See id. at562-63. The Go%nmnt conceded that"[n cither statutenrits legislative
hist ry contain[ed] extpress congrmional findings rtgarding the effects upon intrttatm commerce
of gun possession in a school zone." Id.
67. Id. at 563-64.
68. See id. at 564.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 564.
71. Id. at 567.
72. See id. at561. The Courtnoted thatthe regulation upheld in Wckam v. FPibum,317
US. III (1942), imovhed econrnic activity in away that the pa=ssion of a gun in aschool zone
does not. See id. at 560.
73. Seeid.at558. Te Court confirmed that mining coal, Hodel v. Virginia Surf - Wining
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); extorting a loan, Perez v. United states, 402 US. 146
(1971); running a restaurant or hotel, Katzcnbach v. McClung. 379 US. 294 (1964); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 US. 241 (1964); and growing wheat, wickard v. FMurn.
317 US. 111 (1942)-though each was an intrastate activity-we commercial activities validly
regulated by Congress. See id. at 559-60; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 US. at 573-75
(Kennedy, L, concurring) (wrhese and like authorities are within the fair ambit of the Court's
practical conception of comnercial regulation and are not called in question by our decision
today.").
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a criminal statute that "ha[d] nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort
of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms." Moreover, the Court noted that the GFSZA contained no
jurisdictional element that would ensure that the fumn in question
affected or traveled through interstate commerce before implicating the
statute.75
The Court acknowledged that, by giving great deference to
congressional action, some of its prior cases had "taken long steps down
[the] road" to converting congressional authority to a "general police
power" of the sort expressly reserved to the states.76 That said, the Court
did not overrule or even malign any previous Commerce Clause
decisions. In striking down the GFSZA, the Court intimated that it
would not sanction additional expansion of congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause.'
It is significant that Lopez was decided by a narrow (five-to-four)
margin. Justice Soute's dissent called for deference to Congress's
judgment that the regulation addressed a subject that substantially
affected interstate commerce.79 Supporting his position, Justice Souter
quoted Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,8 ° which
states that "'if there is any rational basis for such a finding,"' the statute
must be upheld.81 He then stated that if Congress found that the
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the only
remaining issue for judicial determination is whether the regulatory
means are reasonably related to the constitutionally permissible end.'
74. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
75. See id. The Court distinguished a prior case that upheld federal regulation of gun
possession because it required a showing that the gun had an explicit connection to interstate
commerce, whereas the GFSZA contained no such requirement. See id at 561-62 (discussing
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)); cf Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563,575
(1977) (holding tha a gun shown to travel through interstate commerce provided sufficient nexus
to interstate commerce).
76. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
77. See idU However, Justice Thomas's concurrence called for a tempering of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence that has "drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce
Clause." L at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
78. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. See id. at 551. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion,
in which Justice O'Connorjoined. See id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also
filed a concurring opinion. See id at 584 (Thomas, J, concurring). Justices Stevens, see id at 602
(Stevens, J., dissenting), and Souter, see id at 603 (Souter, J, dissenting), filed dissenting opinions.
And finally. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburgjoined. See id. at 614 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. See id at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. 452 U.S. 264(1981).
81. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 276) (Souter, J., dissenting).
82. See id
420
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IV. CASES INVOLVING LOPEZ-BASED CHALLENGES TO THE VAWA
To date there are scarcely a half-dozen reported cases involving
claims under the VAWA's civil rights provision.' The following three
cases are among the first. An analysis of the defendants' Lopez-based
Commerce Clause challenges and the courts' varying rulings and
rationales illuminates the debate over the constitutionality of the VAWA
and the meaning of Lopez.
A. Doe v. Doe
Doe v. Doe was the first reported case addressing the
constitutionality of the VAWA's civil rights provision. The plaintiff,
filing under the pseudonym Jane Doe, sought damages under the
VAWA's civil rights remedy from her husband for alleged gender-based
violence.' This violence allegedly occurred over the course of
seventeen years in which the defendant threw the plaintiff to the floor,
kicked her, threw sharp objects at her, threatened her life, and destroyed
her personal property. 6 The plaintiff further alleged that her husband
forced her to be a "slave" to him, even requiring her-to lay out his
clothes for his dates with his girlfriends and mistresses."
The defendant's motion to dismiss challenged the constitutionality of
the VAWA as beyond the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause
authority." The defendant relied on Lopez, claiming that "the VAWA
creates a 'plenary federal police power,' outside of the Constitution's
83. See, eg., Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1434-35 (NJD. Iowa 1997) (upholding the
constitutionality of the VAWA, but ordering an interlocutory appeal due to the "controlling
questions of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion." becaus m
the VAWA to be found unconstitutional, the federal district court would have no juriction);
Anisimovv. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531,539-41 (ND. M. 1997) (upholding the VAWA, echoing the
Commerce Clause analysis used by prior courts, and certifying the entire matter for interlocutory
appeal). For newspaper articles that have reported othe claims brought under thz VAWA's civil
rights provision, see Daniel Cude, 3 Ex-Emplo'ees Sue Company for Se.=a Harns x,
SPARTANBURG HELUD-J., Oct. 9,1997, at B8, avauable in 1997 WL 9544426 (indicating that
three domen have brou suitunderthe;VAWAasking for actual and punitive damages, based on
allegations their forr manag sexually haassed and assaulted them); Ben L Kaufman, .E-
Patiet's Suit ClaimsRights Vioated, Wt AIENQ., Oct. 16,1997, at B12, available in 1997
WL 5472907 (reporting that a wonan claimed that her orthopedist had violated her evil rights
under the VAWA throughi uninxvited seual advance).
84. 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
85. See id& at 610. Amici curiae involved in the case war: NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund, National Organization for Womm Foundation, The Connecticut Women's
Education and Legal Fund, Inc= Connecticut Chapter of National Organiztion of Women.
Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Legal Aid Society of Hartford County. Inc,
National Coalition Against Domestic violence, and Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic
Violence See id n.2.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id
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rubric which 'creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers."'89
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut upheld
the VAWA, finding that "[a] rational basis exists for concluding that
gender-based violence, which the VAWA's Civil Rights Remedy
regulates, is a national problem" which substantially affects interstate
commerce and thus warrants regulation under the Commerce Clause.9°
In its decision, the court relied on congressional findings to satisfy the
rational basis requirement.91
The Doe court enumerated the three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause, just as the Lopez
court had done, and then limited its analysis to the third
category-activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. The
court relied bnly on the third category "in light of the Supreme Court's
attention to this prong in Lopez."3
The court proceeded to describe the process involved in reviewing the
constitutionality of a statute under the "substantial effects" category of
permissible Commerce Clause regulation.94 According to the court, the
first inquiry requires a determination of whether a rational basis exists
for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affects interstate
commerce.95 The second step of the review process involves
determining "whether the means chosen by Congress 'are reasonably
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution."'"6
After finding that a rational basis existed for Congress to find that
gender-based violence substantially affects interstate commerce, the
court proceeded to determine whether the means chosen by Congress
were rea-sonably adapted to its intended end.' The court disagreed with
the defen-dant's argument that "the VAWA encroaches on traditional
police powers of the state and impermissibly 'federalizes' criminal,
family law, and state tort law." Responding to this argument, the court
pointed out that the civil rights provision does not infringe upon
traditional areas of state law because it does not involve any arrest or
prosecution of the alleged perpe-trator but instead complements state tort
law.9 The court further found that the VAWA, modeled after other
traditional civil rights legislation, "is reasonably adapted to an end
permitted by the constitution [sic].' '
89. Id. at 612 (quoting United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995)).
90. 1& at 610.
91. See id
92. Seeid at612.
93. d
94. See id.
95. See id
96. Id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981)).
97. See id at616.
98. Id. at 615-16.
99. See id. at616.
100. Id. at 617.
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The court also distinguished the VAWA from the GFSZA, stating that
"the Congressional findings and reports qualitatively and quantitatively
demonstrate the substantial effect on interstate commerce of gender-
based violence, in marked distinction to the [GFSZA] ... which lacked
such analysis, [and involved] only theoretical impact arguments."' 1 The
court repeatedly referred to the legislative findings involved in passing
the VAWA, while acknowledging the Supreme Court's statement in
Lopez that it did not require such findings but would consider them ashelpful.102
The Doe court expressly stated that it would not reach the
constitutionality of the statute's enactment under the Fourteenth
Amendment because it held that it was a permissible exercise of
Congress's commerce power." Nevertheless, in its discussion, the
court focused on the inadequacy of traditional state law sources of
protection from and opportunity for redress for serious crimes against
women.
104
B. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University
Not long after the Doe case, the debate over the constitutionality of
the VAWA ignited with a ruling that the Act was unconstitutional. In
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University," a university
student brought suit against two fellow student athletes who allegedly
raped her."°6 The plaintiff, Christy Brzonkala, went into a dormitory
room of some fellow student athletes with a friend." 7 After her friend
left the room, the two occupants of the room, men who Brzonkala would
later learn were football players, then allegedly took turns raping her.'O
The court first considered whether Brzonkala's complaint suffi-
ciently stated a claim for relief under the VAWA's civil rights pro-
vision." 9 The court stated that the crucial element involved a showing
that the rape was "'committed because of gender or on the basis of gen-
der, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gen-
101. Id. at613.
102. Seeid. at612.
103. See li.
104. See id. n.5. The court recounted Senate findings on that issue as well as Studies
concluding that "crimes disproportionately affecting womm art often treated less seriously than
comparable crimes affecting nan." Id. at 616.
105. 935 F. Supp. 779 (1996). A fairly recent constitutional ruling by Judge Ks.r, the
presiding judge in Brzonkala, held that Virginia Military Institute could remain al.male vidtut
violating the Equal Protection Claus of the Fourteenth Amendment. United Sta es v. Virginia, 766
F. Supp. 1407, 1415 (WD. Va. 1991). Interestingly, Judge Kiser's decision was revered by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
106. See Brzonkalav. Virginia Polytechnic & Stie Univ. 935 F. Supp. at 781-82.
107. See id.
108. See id. at782.
109. See id. at 783-85 (referring to FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6)).
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der."' "° It concluded that the allegations, if true, were sufficient to
fulfill the requirements for relief under the statute by a showing of
gender animus."'
After concluding that Brzonkala had stated a claim, the court
proceeded to consider the constitutionality of the statute.'12 The court's
analysis began with a recap of Congress's Commerce Clause power and
a discussion of Lopez."' Specifically, it considered whether the VAWA
was a permissible use of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 4 In
addressing this issue, it considered the Lopez Court's concern that
the scope of the interstate commerce power "must be considered in
the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended
so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and
remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is -national and
what is local and create a completely centralized governinent. 15
The court stated that it had "'heeded that warning"' and had undertaken
to determine whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that
the "regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce."" 6 It
further noted that Congress may not regulate activities with only a
relatively trivial impact on commerce.'17 This focus on federalism,
paired with the preceding quote, gave an early clue that the court's
posture on the issue was not favorable. Specifically, it appeared that the
court did not see the nexus between the regulated conduct and interstate
commerce and that it believed Congress had overstepped its bounds
under its Commerce Clause power.
Resembling the judicial analyses in Lopez and Doe, the court
immediately dismissed the first and second categories which Congress
110. Id. at 784 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994)).
111. See M. at 784-85. The court found sufficient evidence of gender animus based upon
Brzonkala's allegations that
she had met Morrison and Crawford less than a half-hour before she was raped, that
Morrison and Crawford participated in a gang rape of Brzonkala, Morrison having sex
with her one time before and one time after Crawford had sex with her, that neither
Morrison nor Crawford used a condom, that, after raping her the second time, Morrison
stated to Brzonkala, "You better not have any fucking diseases," and finally that, within
about five months after the rapes, Morrison announced publicly in the dormitory's
dining hall and in the presence of at least one woman, "I like to get girls drunk and fuck
the shit out of them."
Id. at 784. The court declined to decide whether an allegation of rape alone would be sufficient to
state a claim, stating that "[a]ll rapes am not the same, and the characteristics of the rapes here
alleged, when compared to other rapes, indicate that gender animus more likely played a part in
these rapes than in some other types of rape." Id.
112. See iat785-801. -
113. See id. at 785-87.
114. Seei.
115. Id at 786 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 519,557 (1995)) (internal citations
omitted).
116. Id
117. See id.
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may regulate under the Commerce Clatse. s Therefore, if the court
were to uphold the VAWA, it would have to be a permissible exercise
of power under the third category: "[I]t must regulate an activity that
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce."" 9 In its analysis under
the third category, the court delved further into the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Lopez, parsing the analysis and focusing on the Lopez
Court's determination that the activity regulated was non-economic"an
The court noted that the Lopez Court differentiated between situations
where regulated intrastate activity is economic in nature and situations
where the intrastate activity is non-economic in nature.'2' The court then
concluded that under such an analysis, cases such as Wickard v.
Filburn, "where regulated intrastate activity is economic in nature, do
not control cases where regulated intrastate activity is not economic.'
The court criticized the Doe court's use of Wickard in upholding the
VAWA, stating that its analysis was contrary to Lopez, which had
distinguished the Wickard case.' The court further explained that after
Lopez, reliance on Wickard to analyze the commerce power in a case
involving a non-economic intrastate activity is "not tenable.'"S In
addition to Wickard, the court distinguished all other cases upon which
the plaintiff relied heavily as cases involving economic activity. 6
In discussing Congress's findings, the court found that it was
reasonable to infer from such findings that violence against women has
a major effect on the national economy." Nevertheless, the court was
118. See id. The court found that the
VAWA is not"a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerc, nor is it
an attempt to prohiit the interst transporation of a commodity through the channels
of commerce" Also, VAWA is not a regulation by wich Congress has sought to
protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing in interstam comm=c
Admittedly women often travel between states, as do their abus=s and assailants, but
certainly more is required to qualify for the commr= power.
Id. (citations omitted).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 786-87.
121. See id.
122. 317U.S. III (1942).
123. Brzonkala v. VirginiaPolytechnic & StateUniv, 935 F. Supp. at 787 (emphasis added).
124. See id at 791.
125. See id
126. See id at 791-92. The court noted the following cases involving federal statutes wbich
regulated intrastate economic activity. Hodel v. Virginia Surftir Mining &Recamation, 452 U.S.
264 (1981) (coal mining); Perez v. United Statm 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (extortionate credit
transactions); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurants); and Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 US. 241 (1964) (inns and hotels); see also Brzonkala v. Vi rginia
Polytechnic & StareUniv, 935 F. Supp. at 791-92 (citing United States v. Lop= 514 US. 549. 557
(1995)).
Latching onto the Supreme Court's "economic v. non-economic" analysis in Lop. the court
proceeded to note the similarities and differences between the VAWA and the GFSZA and found
no meaningful distinction between them. See hi at 792-93.
127. See iL at792.
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uncomfortable with Congress's focus on the effect on the "national
economy." The court eschewed the Government's reasoning, stating:
Showing that something affects the national economy does not suffice
to show that it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Plaintiff uses "effects on the national economy" interchangeably with
"effects on interstate commerce." This is wrong. Undoubtedly
effects on the national economy in turn affect interstate commerce.
Such a chain of causation alone, however, is insufficient to bring an
act within the purview of the commerce power. If such a chain of
causation sufficed, Congress's power would extend to an unbounded
extreme. 
129
The court supported its position by recounting a "horrible
hypothetical" furnished by the defendant about the cost of insomnia on
interstate commerce. 12 9  The court extended the reasoning of the
hypothetical to show that matters typically regulated by the states, such
as family law, affect the national economy substantially and thus have
some effect on interstate commerce."3 The court indicated that, under
such an analysis, these issues too would be within Congress's power to
regulate.' The court concluded that "if the VAWA is a permissible use
of the commerce power because of the regulated activity's effect on the
national economy, which in turn affects interstate commerce, then it
would be inconsistent to deny the commerce power's extension into
family law, most criminal laws, and even insomnia."' The court opined
that "to extend Congress's power to these issues would unreasonably tip
the balance away from the states." '
The court was unimpressed by the limiting language that Congress
injected into the VAWA," 4 which states that the VAWA does not
"confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction over any State law
claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable
distribution of marital property, or child custody decree."' 35 The court
held that the regulated conduct was non-economic and that "[a]
128. d at 792-93.
129. See id at 793. The Court described the defendant's hypothetical as follows:
[lnasomnia costs the United States $15 billion a year. This is as much as the yearly cost
of domestic abuse. Other sources indicate that the cost of insomnia is much higher.
Insomnia undoubtedly also has some effect on interstate travel as insomniacs travel
across state lines for treatment (e.g., to the nationally-renowned Johns Hopkins Sleep
Disorder Center in Maryland). Insomniacs buy medicine that has traveled across state
lines.
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, Congress could conceivably regulate almost any activity relating only
remotely to interstate commerce. -
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id
133. Id
134. See id. at 783.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4) (1994).
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reasonable adherence to Lopez reveal[ed] that the VAWA is not a proper
use of the commerce power.
136
Unlike the Doe court, the Brzonkala court placed little emphasis on
Congress's vast findings in its analysis, noting that congressional
findings were not "necessary" under Lopez, and concluding that the
absence of such findings in Lopez was incidental to that court's
decision.13 ' Thus, the court held that, regardless of the extensive
congressional findings related to the VAWA, it was up to the court to
determine, based on the circumstances and common sense, whether
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that gender-based violence
substantially affects interstate commerce"
Because the court did not uphold the VAWA under the Commerce
Clause, which would have rendered any further analysis unnecessary, it
was necessary for the court to consider the viability of the statute under
the Fourteenth Amendment 1 39 The court found that Congress had
exceeded its power under the Fourteenth Amendment as well, stating
that some state involvement was needed in order to invoke that power."
Based on legislative history, the court acknowledged that the framers
intended the Amendment to apply to "private encroachment on civil
rights,' but a nexus to state action was required for the Fourteenth
Amendment to reach private conduct "even though [that state action]
may be tangential."'41
In December of 1997, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a two-
to-one decision, reversed the district court's decision and reinstated
Brzonkala's lawsuit. In upholding the VAWA as constitutional, the
majority focused a great deal on the substantial legislative history and
employed Hodel's rational basis test.4 In a scathing dissent, Judge
Luttig criticized the majority's "manifest misunderstanding" of Lopez
and praised the district court's careful and thorougha analysis of that
decision and its impact on Commerce Clause jurisprudence.'" The
varying reasoning and analysis employed in the majority opinion and the
dissent highlight the disparate interpretations of Lopez by the courts.
The Fourth Circuit's Brzonkala decision will be further considered in
Section V of this Comment.
136. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. at 793.
137. Seeidzat789.
138. See id.at789-90.
139. See id. at 793-96; see also supra note 13 and accompanying tet.
140. See id. The Supreme Court noted in the Civil Rights Cases: lndividual invasion of
individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [FourVenth A]mcadru" Civil Rights Casm. 109
U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
141. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. at 794; see generaly
Eugene Cressman, The Unhqpy History of Civil Rights Legislatmon, 50 MICt L REV. 1323, 1329-
30(1952).
142. See Brzonkalav. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
143. See iU at 964-66.
144. See id. at 974 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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C. Seaton v. Seaton
With the Doe and Brzonkala rulings, the birth of the debate over the
constitutionality of the VAWA, as manifested in the courts, was
recognized. 45 The next ruling on the constitutionality of the civil rights
provision of the VAWA added yet another level to the debate by
upholding the statute -with strong policy reservations.
In Seaton v. Seaton,"6 Laurel Knuckles Seaton brought an action
against her husband during an acrimonious and high-profile divorce
141
to recover for violation of her civil rights under the VAWA and for
various state tort law claims." Mrs. Seaton filed for divorce from her
husband after years of "controlling, deceitful and abusive behavior, of
which the plaintiff was a victim.' ' 49 The plaintiff's complaint sought
"injunctive relief, incidental and compensatory damages, exemplary and
punitive damages, attorney fees and costs, and other equitable relief."'-'
Mr. Seaton moved for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that
the VAWA was unconstitutional.'' His motion to dismiss was denied
as to the VAWA claim and granted as to state claims. 52 The court
upheld the VAWA as constitutional, focusing on Congress's significant
legislative findings,"3 but noted its disapproval of the sweeping nature
145. See David E. Rovela, He Rules, She Rules On Yio!ence Law, NAT'LLJ., Aug. 12, 1996,
at A8 ("Maybe it's just a coincidence, but the first court rulings on the constitutionality of the
Violence Against Women Act have split along gender lines. A female federaljudge upheld the law,
and a malejudge ruled it unconstitutional.").
146. 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997).
147. The facts of this case have been sensationally publicized. See Judge Upholds VA WA,
NAT'L LJ., July 21, 1997, at AS, stating that:
With reservations, a federal judge... affirmed the constitutionality of [the VAWA] ....
In Seaton v. Seaton . .. Knoxville lawyer Laurel Seaton claims she was beaten, abused,
and belittled during a three-year marriage to businessman Kenneth Seaton. He owns
KMS Enterprises, with holdings including Family Inns of America in nine states. While
their divorce is pending in state court, Mrs. Seaton is suing in federal court for damages
of $40 million to $87 million .... She claimed her husband duped her into signing a
prenuptial agreement. Mr. Seaton claimed his wife was using the federal law "to tip the
equitable scales of distribution in her favor" over marital assets.
Id.
148. See Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1189. The state law claims included assault and
battery (Count ll), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Il), false imprisonment (Count
lV), breach of fiduciary duty (Count V), fraud and conversion (Count VI), and misrepresentation
(Count VII). See id
149. Id Plaintiff was spurred to action by an alleged final altercation in which "defendant
severely threatened and atsaulted her." Id
150. Id
151. See id at 1189-90.
152. Seeid. at 1189.
153. See id at 1190 n.1 ("The court must note for the record, however, the overwhelming
evidence of gender-based violence adduced by the congressional committee that analyzed this
problem. This evidence clearly established a compelling legislative interest in addressing such a
widespread problem.").
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of the statute and indicated concern about family issues being brought
into federal courts, stating.
While there is no doubt that violence against women is a serious
matter in our society, this partictilar remedy created by Congress,
because of its extreme overbreadth, opens the doors of the federal
courts to parties seeking leverage in settlements rather than true
justice. The framers of the Constitution did not intend for the federal
courts to play host to domestic disputes and invade the well-
established authority of the sovereign states."
This analysis echoed the Doe court's emphasis on the vast legislative
findings supporting the VAWA, and the lack thereof supporting the
GFSZA. The court indicated that it viewed the legislative findings as an
important element of the analysis of the VAWA's constitutionality,
stating that the VAWA, "unlike the Act in Lopez, contains extensive
congressional findings into the impact of violence on interstate
commerce."1 55 The court concluded that, "although 'to the naked eye'
there may be no clear rationale for Congress to conclude that violence
against women substantially affects interstate commerce, these
congressional findings may offer a basis to evaluate Congress's
judgment. Finding that there may indeed be a substantial effect
regardless of the statute's reliance on activity that is not visibly
commercial, the court noted that the question remained "whether the
legislative findings provide[d] a rational basis for concluding that
gender-based violence has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."' 1 7
Citing Doe, the court held that because Lopez did not overturn or limit
the "rational basis" test under Hodel, that test was still to be
employed."s From that declaration, the court determined that the
numerous hearings and substantial documentation amassed by Congress
evinced a rational basis for finding that gender-based violence
sufficiently affects interstate commerce and that, therefore, the test was
satisfied.' The court held that, "even though VAWA... is not clearly
commercial on the surface, there was a clear rational basis for
Congress's actions, making the Act valid under the Commerce
Clause. 1
The court, however, again expressed reservations, stating that it was
"reluctantly inclined to agree with the Doe court['s finding] that
Congress had a rational basis for determining that violence against
154. Id at 1190-91.
155. Id at 1192.
156. Id
157. Id. at 1191-93.
158. Seeid at193.
159. See id
160. Id.
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women sufficiently affects interstate commerce.""" The court also
showed tempered concern regarding the possibility that Congress would
now hold hearings and make findings essentially to dodge judicial
scrutiny under the rational basis test:
While it is true that affording undue or excessive weight to the
existence of legislative findings may create an opportunity for
Congress to conduct hearings and compile information merely to
exhibit some rational basis for a statute, this is an unlikely scenario,
so long as the courts exercise reasonableness in their analysis of
legislative findings. Here, it is unlikely Congress would spend four
years determining the effects of gender-based violence on interstate
commerce for the sole purpose of overcoming the rationality test and
the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez, especially since Lopez was
decided after the congressional hearings and findings began being
made.16
Mirroring the Doe court, the Seaton court found the statute
constitutional under the Commerce Clause and, therefore, did not
address whether the statute could be sustained under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Nevertheless, as the Doe court had done, the court
engaged in a cursory equal protection discussion, noting that Congress's
findings grew out of the recognition by many states that their judicial
systems inadequately address "injurious gender-based conduct."' 63 The
court concluded that because "the states did not offer adequate
protection from gender-based crimes, Congress was hardly unreasonable
in creating a civil rights remedy to correct such deficiencies."' The
court went further, observing that in the past the same course was
followed in efforts to correct other pressing social ills, such as racial
discrimination."
V. DIscussIoN
As the Supreme Court predicted," Lopez has resulted in uncertainty
and confusion. The disparate treatment and interpretation of Lopez by
the Doe, Brzonkala, and Seaton courts illustrate this uncertainty. In light
of this confusion, it seems likely that Lopez will be further dissected,
distorted, and contorted, resulting in more contradictory court decisions
before the cloud of confusion is lifted. However, a close analysis of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the Supreme Court's
pronouncements on the commerce power in Lopez can serve to diminish
this confusion.
161. Id
162. Id at 1194.
163. Id; see also S. REP. No. 138, at 49 (1993).
164. Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1194.
165. See id.; see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
166. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
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A. Lopez, Judicial Review, and the Commerce Clause
The enumerated power upon which Congress primarily relies to enact
legislation is the Commerce Clause, which allows Congress to regulate
commerce among the states." The Commerce Clause gives Congress
authority to regulate channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities
of interstate commerce (or persons or things in interstate commerce), or
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." In 1824, Chief
Justice Marshall defined Congress's commerce power in Gibbons v.
Ogden69 as a plenary power that Congress may exercise "to its utmost
extent."' 70 In the following century, that power was often viewed
expansively but, at times, was restricted by the courts.171 Between 1937
and 1994, the Supreme Court found every congressional enactment
under the Commerce Clause sufficiently connected to interstate
commerce to justify federal regulation.'m
Those reading Lopez broadly can be viewed as reacting to the "ever
expanding" uses to which Congress has put its commerce power over the
past sixty years. One argument for a broad reading of Lopez is that the
limits on Congress's commerce power have essentially disappeared and
that this power has grown into a masked federal police power.
Individuals advocating a broad reading of Lopez see the decision not as
simply marking the outer limits of Congress's commerce power but as
167. U.S. CONsr. art. 1, § 8, cL 3.
168. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (identifying three categories that Congress
may regulate under the Commerce Clause).
169. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
170. Id. at 196.
171. See, eag., Carterv. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (finding the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 to be an invalid use of Congress's commerce power based on the
distinction between "production" and "commerce," with production being viewed as a purely local
activity); A.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding the
National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional as applied to Schechter Poultry because
Schechter's activities ve not in the "cunret of comnerce" or "ffecting commercc"); Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal statute which prohibited interstate
transport of any articles produced by companies employing young children undr certa
conditions), overued by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100(1941); Unitd States v. .C. night
Co, 156 US. 1 (1895) (holding that Congress could not forbid a monopoly in "manafatr" under
the Commerce Clause because such activity was under the stat ' power to regulate local activity).
172. Prior to the Supreme Court's 1937 decision in ALRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court significantly constrained Congre's power under the Co
Claus by imposing a variety of formal limitations. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, thm Court, signaling
a less restrictive view of Congress's Commerce Clause power, upheld the National labor Relations
Act of 1935, which created the right to form unions and required employer participation in
collective bargain, despite the statute's regulation of manufacturing and only indirect effect on
interstate commerce See id. at 38-40. Th7e Court found a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce
because the legislation targeted activities that "have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that comm-.-- from
burdens and obstructions." Id. at 37. See also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 (1971)
(upholding le 1 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100.
123 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act).
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retracting the scope of that power. Judge Luttig's dissent in Brzonkala
made clear that he considers Lopez a decision marking an "overarching
change in Commerce Clause analysis."'"
As noted by the Doe, Brzonkala, and Seaton courts, one of the most
far-reaching examples of the Supreme Court's deference to Congress's
use of its commerce power is found in Wickard v. Filbum. 74 In
Wickard, the Supreme Court upheld the application of a federal
regulation limiting the amount of wheat an individual could grow on his
farm for his own consumption.'" The Court found that the subject of
the regulation was sufficiently linked to interstate commerce.176 In Doe,
the court considered Wickard as instructive in "setting forth the outer-
limit of Congress' [sic] authority to regulate private intra-state conduct"
in the absence of any specific test to determine whether the activity
"substantially affects" interstate commerce.1" The Doe court drew an
analogy, stating:
Certainly the repetitive nationwide impact of women withholding,
withdrawing or limiting their participation in the workplace or
market-place in response to or as a result of gender-based violence or
the threat thereof, is of such a nature to be as substantial an impact on
interstate commerce as the effect of excess "home-grown" wheat
harvesting. 178
In Lopez, the Court confirmed that mining coal,7 extorting a loan,
80
running a restaurant or hotel,' and growing wheat,'" though each was
an intrastate activity, were commercial activities validly regulat-ed by
Congress."' All of these cases, however, involved a commercial
173. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ, 132 F.3d 949,974 (4th Cir. 1997)
(Luttig, J., dissenting). Judge Luttig criticized the majority's "analytical superficiality" and
"manifest misreading" of Lopez leading to "its flmdamental misunderstanding of the import of that
decision." l
174. 317U.S. 111 (1942).
175. See id at 128-29.
176. See i. at 127-29. The Court reasoned that while one farmer's excess production might
not have a significant impact on interstate commerce, the same conduct repeated by those similarly
situated could have a significant impact on interstate commerce by reducing market prices for
wheat. See id.
177. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608,614 (D. Conn. 1996).
178. Id. Congress regulated wheat production to prevent fluctuations in wheat prices. See
id Because Filbur grew wheat in excess of his quota, he did not buy wheat on the market. See
id His actions defeated Congress's goal by reducing market demand and wheat prices. See id The
Brzonkala court criticized the Doe court's use of Wickard in this analogy due to its obvious
commercial character. See Brzonkalav. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,791-
92(1996).
179. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
180. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
181. See Katzenbach v. McClung. 379 US. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
182. See Wickard v. Fbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
183. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995) (concluding that where economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
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element that was fairly evident. Therefore, in viewing the use of the
Commerce Clause power in cases where the commercial character of the
regulated conduct or activity is "not visible to the naked eye," the less
clearly economic cases are more instructive. Katzenbach v. McClung,"'
and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States"' both involved
activity (racial discrimination) with a connection to commerce that
arguably was not "visible to the naked eye," but that activity was held to
be validly regulated by Congress.
The Lopez Court reiterated that, in regulation of intrastate activities
which do not involve channels of interstate commerce or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the test is whether the regulated
conduct "substantially affects" interstate commerce." In determining
whether the conduct substantially affects interstate commerce, the Court
reaffimed the "rational basis" test announced in Hodel.'" In employing
the Hodel test, courts naturally look to the legislative history
surrounding the enactment of the suspect statute to discern if Congress
indeed had a rational basis for determining that the regulated activity
substantially. affected interstate commerce. As Justice Souter pointed
out in his Lopez dissent, the Supreme Court stated in Katzenbach v.
McClung that, "'here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and
testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our
investigation is at an end. '
Justice Souter's dissent in Lopez also brings to light the judicial slight
of hand attempted by the Lopez majority. He pointed out that the
standard applied by the majority was actually much stricter than a
rational basis review."8 9 Although the majority applied a stricter test
than the Hodel "rational basis" test, it cited Hodel to support its
position."n Justice Souter highlighted the fact that the majority upset the
traditional analysis by indicating that less deference to legislative
findings is appropriate when the regulated activity is non-commercial in
nature.19 He also warned that the majority's concern about federalism
signaled a possible return to a more intrusive review, which was
sustained); see ako i& at 573-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ('Tese and ik autharities are within
the fair ambit of the Court's practical conception of commercial regulation and ame not cafled in
question by our decision today.").
184. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
185. 379 US. 241 (1964).
186. See United States v. Lopz 514 U.S. at 558-59.
187. See id. at557 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264,276-80 (1981)).
188. See id. at 607 (Souter, J, dissenting) (quoting Katenbacb v. McClung. 379 U.S. 294.
303-04(1964)).
189. See id. at 608-09 (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 557-58 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Nfining & Reclamation Ass'n. 452
US. at 276-77).
191. See id. at 608 (Souter, J, dissenting).
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inconsistent with the judicial role."9 Because of the cloud of confusion
and uncertainty hanging over the Lopez decision, the dissenting opinions
in the decision may prove to be as important as the majority opinion.
In the Fourth Circuit's Brzonkala decision, Judge Luttig's dissent
criticized the majority's "application of a principle of absolute judicial
deference to a committee finding-precisely what the Supreme Court
held in Lopez was no longer appropriate in the review of Commerce
Clause challenges."'" Judge Luttig, evidently failing to give any weight
to the mass of testimony in the record, proceeded to state that the
"majority's wholesale deference to a committee finding would at least
be understandable if that committee had made extensive findings
deserving of deference."' ' 4
There aie two principal flaws in this position. First, Judge Luttig
apparently failed to consider any of the testimony offered that
specifically addressed the economic effects of violence against women.
For example, domestic violence alone is estimated to cost this country
"at least 3 billion... dollars a year" due to lost careers, decreased
productivity, long-term health problems, and other societal expenses. 95
Second, Judge Luttig failed to consider the role that the judiciary plays
in the constitutional review of statutes. That role does not call for
second guessing of Congress's findings but, instead, requires that the
court simply ensure that Congress had a rational basis upon which to rest
its legislative decisions.
In upholding the constitutionality of the VAWA, the Fourth Circuit
majority acknowledged that "every act of Congress is entitled to a
'strong presumption of validity and constitutionality' and will be
invalidated only 'for the most compelling constitutional reasons. '1' 96
The Fourth Circuit majority supported this narrow view of the courts'
role by citing recent Supreme Court cases calling for deference and
restraint in reviewing legislative judgments." The majority recognized
that "'[t]he task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular
exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is
192. See id (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 975 (4th Cir.
1997).
194. Id at 976 (Luttig, J., dissenting). Justice Lutig characterized the legislative findings as
showing "the enormity of the problem of domestic violence," but not "the problem's effects on
interstate commerce." At
195. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33 (1990) (citing E. Schneider, "Legal Reform Efforts for
Battered Women: Past, Present, and Future," at 4 (prepared for the Ford Foundation, July, 1990)).
196. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d at 964 (quoting Barwick
v. Celotex Corp, 736 F.2d 946,955 (4th Cir. 1984) and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
384 (1989)).
197. See id.; see also FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,314 (1993) (stating
that deference to such judgments by the legislature constitutes the "paradigm ofjudicial restraint');
Westside Comm. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,251 (1990) (stating that a court should
"not lightly second-guess such legislative judgments").
[Vol. 50:409
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
relatively narrow."' 1I The court quoted Justice Kennedy's concurrence
in Lopez, stating that "[tihe history of the judicial struggle to interpret
the Commerce Clause... counsels great restraint before the Court
determines that the Clause is insufficient to support an exercise of the
national power."1  The Fourth Circuit realized that a reviewing court
need only determine whether a rational basis exists for concluding that
a regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce.
B. The Role of Congressional Findings in Commerce Clause Review
The analysis of Congress's legislative findings is a crucial step in
determining whether Congress validly acted within its Commerce Clause
powers, particularly when the connection to interstate commerce is not
"visible to the naked eye." In Lopez, the Court was essentially left to its
own devices (and Justice Breyer's own research)' to make the
connection between the GFSZA and interstate commerce. Contrary to
the Brzonkala court's suggestion, the dearth of legislative findings was
not "merely incidental" to the Court's decision in Lopez."' Rather, the
Court had no findings to consider in determining whether Congress had
a rational basis to find that guns in school zones had an effect on
interstate commerce.2?2
The Doe, Brzonkala, and Seaton courts correctly found that the civil
rights provision of the VAWA could only be upheld if violence against
women "substantially affects" interstate commerce. As the Seaton court
correctly stated, even after Lopez, the test under which courts must
review the constitutionality of a statute enacted under the Commerce
Clause is the rational basis test announced in Hodel. 3 It is neither
logical nor reasonable to believe that judges have an independent base
of knowledge from which they can determine whether all regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, particularly when the connection is
not "visible to the naked eye." Therefore, it is logical and necessary for
courts to consider the congressional findings to discern whether
Congress indeed had a rational basis for determining that the regulated
activity substantially affects interstate commerce.
The Doe and Seaton courts placed the proper emphasis on Congress's
vast findings in employing the Hodel rational basis test, as did the Fourth
198. Brzokalav. Virinia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d at 965 (quoting HodM
v. Virginia Surface iming &Reclamnation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)).
199. ld. at 965 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. 568 (1995) (Kernnedy, J.
concurring)).
200. See HaIney Bekanan Court Declares 'No Tresp.s: The three branches and the states
shouldgo to their respective corne., NAT'LLJ., July 14. 1997, at A26 (quoting Profer Gerald
Gud=, stating that in Lopez Justice Breyer did the research to show the effe= of guns in schools,
not Congress).
201. See Brzonkalav. Virginia Polyt chnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,790 (1996).
202. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
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Circuit in Brzonkala. Those courts deferred to Congress's judgment
after viewing the findings because it was reasonable for Congress to find
that violence against women has a substantial effect on the national
economy and, therefore, affects interstate commerce. On the contrary,
the trial court in Brzonkala determined that it could either choose to
consider such findings, or it could find the connection itself. The court
chose the latter option and undertook the task of finding the connection
absent a consideration of the findings. Failing to see a strong enough
nexus between violence against women and interstate commerce, it then
determined that Congress had overreached its commerce power. This
type of analysis, ignoring congressional findings, is unreasonable and
unwise. Legislation with as much factual support as the VAWA should
not be ruled invalid because a court fails to give proper weight to that
support.
C. The Rehnquist Court and Federalism
After reviewing the Lopez Court's pronouncements and recent
Supreme Court decisions relating to judicial review of legislation based
on the Commerce Clause, it may seem that Lopez was intended to apply
narrowly and that the VAWA is secure. This security may, however, be
unfounded: Lopez cannot be dismissed as judicial censure and may
indeed have a significant effect due to the Rehnquist Court's policing of
matters of structure. 4 Some commentators, grouping Lopez with the
Court's decisions that same term in United States Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton °5 and Missouri v. Jenkins, o have offered a more dramatic
assessment, contending that Lopez in fact signaled a turning point in the
Court's basic approach to federalism ° Speculation about the reach of
Lopez further intensified in the wake of the Court's decision the
following term in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.' In Seminole Tribe, the
204. See Wendy M. Rogovin. The Politics of Facts: The illusion of Certainty, 46 HASrINGS
,J. 1723, 1725 & n.6 (1995) (interpreting Lopez and several other recent decisions as showing the
Rehnquist Court moving away from deference to Congress); see also Berkman, supra note 200, at
Al:
Highway road carews periodically repaint faded dividing lines to restore their clarity and
brightness. According to several scholars, that's what the U.S. Supreme Court did in the
1997 spring term merely retouch the lines on the familiar Constitutional highway..
The Court ended its term with a remarkable series of decisions involving the
Constitution's separation of powers, a longtime interest of the Chief Justice W'illiam H.
Rehnquist.
Id Berknan further discussed how the Rehnquist Court struck down three federal laws in one
week: the Brady Gun Control Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Communications
Decency Act. See id
205. 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that states may not impose additional qualifications for
congressional or senatorial office outside of those set forth by the Constitution).
206. 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (holding that the district court's orders had exceeded the scope of
federal power to remedy the effects of past discrimination in the state school system).
207. See generally Berkman, supra note 200.
208. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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Court held that Congress lacked authority under the Indian Commerce
Clause to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit
in federal court. In a front-page story the day after the Court issued its
opinion in Seminole Tribe, the New York Times reported that it had
become "evident now that the Lopez decision was a signal that the
current majority is in the process of revisiting some long-settled
assumptions about the structure of the Federal Government and the
constitutional allocation of authority between Washington and the
states.,s21o
In response to such a grave warning, those on the other side of the
debate point to the language of the Court in Lopez, including Justice
Kennedy's concurrence (joined by Justice O'Connor), expressly
reaffirming the Court's expansive interpretation of the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.2n When focusing on the
language of the Court, the Lopez opinion appears not to redefine the
Court's view of Congress's commerce power but rather to limit that
power, signaling when Congress has gone "too far." In fact, the majority
in Lopez indicated that it intended to set an outer limit on Congress's
Commerce Clause authority, not to depart from well-established
Commerce Clause precedent. Commentators note that "[c]ases like
Lopez... result less from any incipient high court activism trampling the
political branches than from an increase in congressional indolence." 13
Among those legal scholars who view such Supreme Court statements
as dispositive on the reach of Lopez is Stanford Law School Professor
Emeritus Gerald Gunther, an expert on constitutional law, who stated:
Lawmakers have gotten so lazy that they feel they can legislate and let
the court do the rest of the work.... That's what [Justice Stephen
G.] Breyer did in Lopez: He did the research... for them. The
appendix to his opinion.., was his research not Congress', as to what
the impact on commerce might be214
With regard to Title 1II of the VAWA, the fears about federalism are
misplaced. Unlike the GFSZA at issue in Lopez, the civil rights
provision is not a criminal statute and it displaces no state criminal law.
Moreover, in deference to areas traditionally encompassed by state law
such as divorce and child custody, Congress expressly limited the reach
of the VAWA, stating that it does not "confer on the courts of the United
States jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking establishment of a
divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child
209. See id. at 47.
210. Linda Greenhouse, Jusaes Curb Federal Power to Subject States to Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at At.
211. See United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549,556-57, see also id. at 568 (Kennedy, J,
concurring).
212. See i& at 566-67.
213. Bedanan, spra note 200, at A26.
214. /I (quoting Professor Gerald Gunther).
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custody decree."2 5 Critics would say that this proscription is illusory,
pointing to the fact that several of the Title III cases arising thus far, such
as Doe and Seaton, are actually disputes stemming from marital
dissolution and, indeed, have the effect of bringing family law matters
into the federal courts. Even if this contention has merit, there are civil
rights arguments that defeat federalism concerns regarding the VAWA's
civil rights provision.
D. Civil Rights and the Commerce Clause
Unlike the GFSZA, Title III of the VAWA does not address an area
of law solely occupied by the state. Instead, it involves civil rights, an
area traditionally regulated by the federal government. Title IM stemmed
from the joining of civil rights and the Commerce Clause, which is not
a novel arrangement." 6 In Katzenbach v. McClung217 and Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,218 the Supreme Court sanctioned
Congress's use of the Commerce Clause to regulate racial discrimina-
tion.21 9 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 required public establishments,
such as restaurants and hotels, to serve their customers without regard
to their race or color.22 For instance, in Katzenbach the Court upheld
that provision of the Act as a valid exercise of the commerce power
because of the effects of racial discrimination on interstate travel and
because the food served in the restaurant had moved in interstate
commerce.221 Detractors of the expansive use of the commerce power
could reasonably argue that these and many other cases allowed for the
use of the commerce power even when the effects on interstate
commerce were remote and speculative. In fact, the Civil Rights Act
contained no congressional findings about the impact of discrimination
in public accommodations on commerce. The Court, however, found a
rational basis upon which Congress could conclude that the chosen
regulatory scheme was necessary for the protection of commerce.
The Lopez Court paid little attention to Katzenbach and Heart of
Atlanta. This avoidance could be explained on the basis that the GFSZA
was a criminal statute, which displaced state law, while Katzenbach and
Heart of Atlanta dealt with racial discrimination. It is clear, however,
that those two decisions are important to the consideration of the
215. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(eX4) (1994).
216. See Anna Kampourakis & Robin C. Tarr, Note, About F.A.C.E in the Supreme Court:
The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act in Light of Lopez, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 191, 193-98 (1995) (giving a brief history of the origin of Congress's use of the
Commerce Clause in civil rights legislation).
217. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). "
218. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
219. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 304; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United
States, 379 U.S. at 261-62.
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-l (1994); see, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 298.
221. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 304; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. at 261.
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challenges facing Title M of the VAWA because of their importance in
the history of civil rights. Viewing those cases in concert with
subsequent instances of federal statutory creation and protection of civil
rights demonstrates how civil rights and the Commerce Clause have
been successfully joined in the past. This connection has endured
judicial scrutiny before and should continue to withstand scrutiny now.
The findings surrounding the VAWA clearly demonstrate a strong
economic connection between violence against women and the national
economy. Courts can, have, and should find that Congress had a rational
basis upon which to rest the enactment of the VAWA.
E. The Fourteenth Amendment Alternative
Although this Comment concludes that the VAWA is constitutionally
sound under the Commerce Clause, it should be noted that some legal
scholars and commentators have suggested that the authority granted by
the Fourteenth Amendment is a more logical base of power than the
Commerce Clause under which to uphold the VAWA. 2z The arguments
for upholding the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment maintain that
state laws often deny remedies to victims of gender-motivated violence,
and that the inconsistencies in state laws serve to protect victims in some
states while leaving no remedy for victims in other states. 3 For
example, a man who rapes his wife or cohabitant may be subject to less
strict criminal sanctions than a man who rapes a stranger zu In some
states he may be subject to no criminal penalty for raping his wife or
cohabitant.225 In several states, "women who are beaten or assaulted by
their husbands still are denied access to a tort remedy by interspousal
tort immunity doctrines."225
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,22 the Court stated that "correctly viewed,
Section 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress
to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is
222. See, e.g., David E. Rovella, Judge OKs Volene" Act: The Commerce Claue Is
Invoked to Sustain the VWolence Against Women Act, NATLLJ, July 8,1996, at A6. In discussing
Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996), Rovella's article stated:
[C]onstitutional law experts said Judge Arterton's rationale is extremely vulnerable to
reversal because it turned on her reading of US. v. Lopez ..... "Mjudge chose a
dangerously vak argmnL Lopez at least involved a gun-a manuactured item-as
a connection to commaerce," said Judy Becke Sloan, a professor of women's legal
issues at Southwestern University School of Law in Los Angeles. She said the district
court should have relied on the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause
Id
223. See Goldscbeid &uKrabhm. srra note 42, at 519 nnl14-15 (noting the states that still
mcognirintespousal immunity defe th sta thathavecpudiated the defense; and the states
that have limited its applicability).
224. See id. at 506.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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needed to secure the guarantees of th6 Fourteenth Amendment."'
Congress can exceed the self-executing provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment by outlawing practices it finds to violate Section 1, even if
the courts have specifically ruled that such practices do not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. According to the Civil Rights Cases, 9 "[i]f the
laws themselves make any unjust discrimination ... Congress has full
power to afford a remedy under that amendment and in accordance with
it."" Therefore, Congress has wide latitude under the Fourteenth
Amendment as long as Congress's acts have some reasonable possibility
of addressing a legitimate equal protection concern.
The problem, of course, is that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
empower Congress to legislate against private acts of violence." 1 Some
authority, however, indicates that Congress may address seemingly
private conduct via Section 5' of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
absence of concrete and express state action. 2 Under this view, the
involvement of the State need not be either "exclusive or direct." ' In
fact, even "peripheral" state action may be sufficient "to create rights
under the Equal Protection Clause."'
By invoking the Fourteenth Amendment as a second base of power in
its enactment of the VAWA, Congress relied on a theory of state
complicity in the treatment of certain violent crimes against women.
While it is clear that state inaction is not sufficient to allow the extension
of the Fourteenth Amendment to private conduct, in recent years courts
have attempted to draw lines and outline the parameters of exactly when
this extension may occur and what type of connection to private conduct
is sufficient. This line is currently unclear, but the idea has been
expressed that if the state breaches its duty to protect a right by allowing
others to violate it, such inaction may suffice to allow an extension to the
violative private conduct? 5 The failure of law enforcement officials
nationwide to adequately protect victims of domestic violence, and the
228. ld. at 651. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Supreme Court upheld a legislative ban on
literacy tests for voting, though it had not found such tests to be discriminatory. See icL at 657-58.
229. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
230. lit at 25.
231. See, e.g., Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 384 (1979)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize Congress to
create rights against private individuals even where gender discrimination is involved).
232. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 754-56 (1966) (suggesting, but not
deciding, that Congress may reach private conduct under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
233. Id at 755.
234. Id But see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (finding that conduct
allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right must be fairly attributable to the state).
235. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act of 1993, 1 VA. .SOC. POL'Y &L 291,298 (1994) (stating that a state's inability to
resolve problems justified congressional intervention to protect constitutional rights).
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bias in the system that those victims and victims of sexual assault
currently face, surely give rise to legitimate equal protection concems.P6
VL CONCLUSION
In enacting the VAWA, Congress recognized that gender motivates
rapes, sexual assaults, and beatings. To provide women with the means
of enforcing their right to be free from gender-motivated violence,
Congress included the civil rights remedy.P In doing so, Congress
invoked the same powers used in enacting other civil rights statutes,
which have weathered constitutional challenges and provided redress for
many wronged plaintiffs.P8
The treatment of the VAWA in the courts is similar to that which
many other federal statutes currently face. At the heart of it all lies
Lopez. What effect did the Court intend Lopez to have on Congress's
Commerce Clause power? Does Lopez signal a retraction of the
expansiveness of that power? Is Lopez simply an aberration limited to
236. See Lsa A. Carroll, Comment, Women's Powerless TooL" How Congress Oreneadied
. the Comton v the CivilRights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 30 J. MARSALL
LRV. 803 (1997) (describing ineffective responses to violence against waom by the states); se
also Melanie L Winskie, Can Fe*ralism Save the Violence Against Women Ac:?, 31 GA. L REV.
985,985 n.1 (1997), for a collection of sources
re%=ng that Floidajudge stted durng sentencing at he itied mpi= because ferale
victim was "pathetic". .. ;judge stated during hearing that domestic violence victim
"pobably should have been hit" ... ; a prosecutor discounted testimony of 15-)y=r-old
girl and asked questions such as "Come on, you can tell me. You're probably just
worred that your boyfriend got you pregnan, right? Isn't that why you're saying he
raped you?" .. 4judge "led the coumoom in laughter as the woman [domestic violence
victim who was subsequently killed by her estranged husband] telW...; detctive told
mothmr of 14-year-old rape victim that because the child only said "no" once, incident
may not constitute rape.. .; judge commented in court that he did not believe domestic
violenc= victim's testimony "because I don't believe that anything i this could happen
to me" ... ; probation officer stated that nine-year-old girl may not be "rMl victim"
because she was rumored to be "a tramp"....
Id. (internal citations omitted).
237. For a different view of Congress's possible motivations. see Patcia Schroedtr. StWppng
Volence Against Women Still Takes a Fight: If in Doubt, Just Look at the 104th Congress. 4 J.L
&POL'Y 377,377 (1996) Cmuplying the commitmentto ending violence against women only ran as
deep as the 1994 elections). Ms. Schroeder, a long-term member of Congress from Colorado,
observes:
At the end of the 1994 congressional session, the U.S. House of Representatives
unanimously passed VAWA.... Certainly, every member seeking reelection wanted
to be seen as taking a strong stand against the insidious problem of violence against
women.
But with the 1994 elections, a dark shadow fell over VAWA: When it came to
funding this landmark legislation, the new Congress wanted none of it.
Id.
238. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (popularly referred to as Tidle VII); see also Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241.261-62 (1964) (upholding the constitutionality
of Title II ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to a motel); Katz nbach v. McClung. 379 U.S.
294,304-05 (1964) (upholding the constitutionality of Title i of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
applied to restaurants).
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its specific facts? These questions are central to the debate over the
constitutionality of the VAWA.
As many predicted, Lopez has prompted many constitutional
challenges to federal legislation, but few have succeeded. Courts have
consistently upheld federal legislation enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. As the Seaton court noted, "'most courts have
resisted urgings to extend Lopez beyond [the GFSZA."'u2
The confusion over the post-Lopez reach of Congress's commerce
authority must be dispelled so that plaintiffs bringing actions under
federal statutes validly enacted pursuant to this power are not denied
their day in court. The Seaton court was correct in adopting the Sixth
Circuit's position "'that until the Supreme Court provides a clearer
signal or cogent framework to handle this [Commerce Clause-based]
legislation"' after Lopez, it will adhere to prior Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and exercise significant restraint."
While the reversal of Brzonkala by the Fourth Circuit seems to place
the VAWA on more secure ground for the meantime, Lopez remains
enigmatic to courts. The speculation created by recent Supreme Court
decisions, seemingly focusing on federalism concerns, adds another
layer of uncertainty to the VAWA's future. Inevitably, the Supreme
Court will have to clarify Lopez and its effects on Congress's Commerce
Clause power. As Judge Luttig pointed out in his dissent in Brzonkala,
the debate over the constitutionality of the VAWA "pristinely presents"
the opportunity for the Supreme Court to revisit its pronouncements in
Lopez and offer much needed clarification.' 2 When the Court does
clarify Lopez, it should affirm the propriety of the Hodel "rational basis"
test, encourage deference by the courts to congressional findings, and
239. See, e.g., United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding criminalization
of gambling operations of a certain size); United States v. Sodera, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996)
and United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding Feedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act); United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding statute
prohibiting possession of firearm). For additional decisions upholding federal statutes facing
Commerce Clause challenges, see United States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir.
1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 234 (8th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Oliver, 60 F3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wiliams, 51 F.3d 1004 (11 th
Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 258 (1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (1 th Cir. 1995); and
American Lfe League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995), cer. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995).
240. Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (quoting United States v.
Wall, 92 F.3d at 1448).
241. Id at 1194.
242. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F3d 949,997 (4th Cir. 1997)
(Luttig, J., dissenting). Judge Luttig prophesied
that, even in its discretion, the Supreme Court would not allow today's decision to stand,
not only because of the decision's bold intransigence in the face of the Court's recent
decision, but also because the Commerce Clause challenge to the instant statute
pristinely presents the Court with the logical next case in its considered revisitation of
the Commerce Clause.
1d (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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thereby ensure that validly enacted federal statutes, such as the VAWA,
remain intact through narrow judicial review.
Lisanne Newell Leasure

